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ERISA Preemption, HMOs, and Denial of Benefit Claims
L INTRODUCTION
A forty-six year old woman suffering from leukemia is denied a bone
marrow transplant; a sixteen year old child with cystic fibrosis is denied access
to medical specialists; and a fifty-two year old man with a brain tumor is
misdiagnosed for two years before being declared a hopeless case and denied
treatment.' In each of these cases, the proposed treatment that might have
prolonged or saved these individuals' lives was denied by their respective health
maintenance organizations (HMOs). 2 The woman and child died, and the man
elected to go outside his health plan to receive chemotherapy, but was forced to
pay out-of-pocket for the treatment.' Is there a remedy available to these
individuals for the neglect or malpractice of their HMOs in denying the
necessary treatment? Under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA),4 these patients' claims of malpractice against their HMOs for
injuries resulting from denial of benefits will likely be preempted, leaving them
with little or no available remedy.
Theories of liability and remedies typically available to patients for
traditional medical malpractice are generally not available for malpractice by the
HMO, because HMOs are immune from liability by virtue of the express
preemption clause of ERISA. s This clause provides for preemption of all state
laws that "relate to" ERISA qualified benefit plans. The provision has allowed
for a broad interpretationby the courts of ERISA preemption which has resulted
in the creation of a gap in an area of the law that states cannot regulate and that
Congress has not regulated: ERISA-qualified employee health plans or IMOs.6
This gap has served as a shield of immunity for IMOs against traditional
medical malpractice claims. The effect of this shield is that lHMOs are protected
from legal attack and HMO patients are prevented from recovering for lost
wages, death or disability, pain and suffering, emotional distress or other harm
that a patient suffers as a result of improper denial of care Preemption of state
Copyright 1999, by LOUISLANA LAW REVIEW.
1. William Welch, The New Untouchables-You Can't Sue Your HMO, USA Today, June 19-
21, 1998, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1998).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998). "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provision of this subchapter and subchapter II1 of this chapter shall supercede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."
6. Though both ERISA-qualified HMOs and non-ERISA HMOs exist, for the purposes of this
paper, "HMO" will refer only to ERISA-qualified plans.
7. Ronald Brown, EPA-Employees Receive Insurance Shaft Again, "Recent HMO News"
(visited Oct. 6,1998) <http-J/www.hmopage.orgindex.html >;see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aXl) (1998)
under which a plan participant may only recover benefits due to him under the plan. See also
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law medical malpractice claims effectively eliminates the HMO patient's ability
to recover for personal injury because damages under ERISA are limited to the
actual cost of medical services and attorney fees.s
However, there is a current trend to abrogate the immunity enjoyed by
HMOs. The question of whether patients should be able to sue their HMOs if
they are wrongly denied treatment is the tip of a large health care reform iceberg.
Currently, ERISA governs HMOs covering approximately 125 million Ameri-
cans.9 A June 1998 survey by the Pew Research Center indicated that the
potential regulation of HMOs was the most important issue to respondents and
the country at large.' A poll by Harvard University revealed that "78% [of
those polled favored] laws that would provide more consumer protections for
people enrolled in managed care plans.""
In response to rising consumer complaints, several bills were proposed in
Congress in 1998 supporting increased consumer protections in health care.
However, there is a clear split along party lines regarding the issue of HMO
liability. Democratic party leaders and consumer groups support amending
ERISA in order to make HMOs accountable for the quality of care provided and
to act as a deterrent against making benefit decisions based on cost-containment
strategies. 2 Republican leaders and business groups claim that allowing
malpractice suits against IMOs would defeat the purpose of HIMOs by increasing
the cost of health care.' 3
Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997) (plaintiff's claim preempted
by ERISA, therefore no recovery for wrongful death of husband related to denial of benefits). Note,
however, te strong language used by the court: "This (result], of course, is ridiculous. The tragic
events set forth in [the] complaint cry out for relief.... Under traditional notions of justice, the
harms alleged-if true-should entitle [the plaintiff] to some legal remedy .... Nevertheless, this
Court has no choice but to pluck [the plaintiffs] case out of state court in which she sought redress
... and then, at the behest of [the defendants], to slam the courthouse doors in her face and leave
her without a remedy." Id. at 52-53.
8. Theodore Babbitt, Meeting the Defenses: Rejuting ERISA Preemption of State Law Claims
in HMO Cases, 34 MAY Trial 55 (1998).
9. Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, The Department
of Labor's Response to the Health Care Commission's Bill of Rights: Implementing the
Commission's Bill of Rights and Responsibilities Through ERISA, February 19, 1998.
10. Pew Research Center, What Americans think- What's important to them, Spectrum: The
Journal of State Government, Vol. 71, No. 3 (1998), 1998 WL 16033698. (This ranked ahead of
the Starr investigation and the Microsoft anti.trust suit.).
11. Elizabeth Neus, People Want HMO Reform; Congress Missing an Opportunity, PollFinds,
Gannett News Services, Sept. 17, 1998, 1998 WL 5635091.
12. David Espo, GOP Muscles HMO Bill Through House, The Advocate, July 25, 1998 at 2A.
See also Welch, supra note 1.
13. Id. See also Welch, supra note I and Neus, supra note 11. (Republicans and their
supporters have claimed that the proponents of the amending ERISA have waged a "casualty of the
day" war, greatly exaggerating the seriousness of the effect of benefit denial, but 77% of those polled
said their views of HMOs were shaped by their own experiences of friends and family. Only 17% said
their views resulted from media horror stories. In addition, 66% of those polled for Kaiser Family
Foundation believed politicians to be using the issue of managed care reform for political advantage.).
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This controversy has also been considered by numerous state legislatures that
have passed laws providing more consumer protections. For example, in 1997,
Texas became the first state to enact a law expressly providing the right to sue
ltMOs." In addition, Missouri's governor has signed a bill into law that
eliminates the liability exemption that HMOs have relied on and allows medical
malpractice claims to be brought against HMOs."5 The question remains,
however, whether these state laws can withstand ERISA preemption.'
The trend in moving away from HMO immunity has also been apparent in
recent Supreme Court decisions. The Court has moved from its broad and
expansive interpretation of ERISA preemption to a narrower construction of the
"relates to" terminology in the preemption clause. This interpretation has served
to narrow the gap, and it has opened the door for state and federal courts to
recognize theories of liability against HMOs, including those for claims of denial
of benefits.
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HMOs AND ERISA
A. What is Managed Care?
An ]HMO is a type of managed care organization (MCO)."' Managed care
was pioneered during World War H,"r but its growth was confined over the
next forty years by state legislation that restricted the practice of corporate
medicine. 9 In the 1970s, the realization that the current fee-for-service health
14. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon's 1997 & Supp. 1998)
(creating a right of action for health care liability in Texas).
15. Missouri HB 335, signed into law June 25, 1997 by Governor Mel Camahan. See Mo.
Ann. Stat. §§ 192.068, 354.400-.410, 354.441-.444, 354.600-.606,354.615-.627 (West Supp. 1998).
16. If these new state laws are deemed to "relate to" an ERISA benefit plan under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) in a way that is not "too tenuous,' the laws will be preempted by ERISA. See Shaw v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 n.21, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2901 n.21 (1983).
17. 1 Barry R. Furrow, Health Law 478 (1995).
18. Corey J. Ayling, Comment, New Developments in ERISA Preemption and Judicial
Oversight of Managed Care, 31 Creighton L. Rev. 403, 404 (1998). Private health insurance was
first offered as a ffinge benefit of employment in the 1920s. Employers in Oklahoma and Los
Angeles offered a managed care type of health insurance as a way of providing low cost medical care
to impoverished employees. During World War II, Kaiser Permanente pioneered managed care for
employees of shipyards and steel mills. Like modern managed care organizations (MCOs), Kaiser
owned its own hospitals, clinics and employed its own physicians. After World War II, health
insurance became a standard benefit of employment. Id. at 434.
19. Alan D. Lieberson, Healthcare Enterprise Liability 804 (1997). During the next forty years,
the growth of MCOs was limited by strong opposition from the American Medical Association
(AMA). The AMA has historically been opposed to the practice of "corporate medicine." Only a
physician who is licensed can practice medicine. Corporations are not natural persons, so they cannot
be licensed to practice medicine; therefore, a corporation that gives physicians direction or
instructions in how to practice medicine is practicing medicine. A commission to study the ethics
of managed care in 1927 suggested the expansion of contract style practice, but the AMA adopted
the minority opinion thatwas against this type of expansion. In 1930, the AMA said itwas unethical
1999)
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care system contributed to cost inflation opened the doors to rapid acceptance
and growth of managed care systems. 0 With the passage of the Health
Maintenance Act of 1973, the federal government encouraged the development
of HMOs.2 The intent of this act was to encourage development of new
programs that promoted preventive care and created incentives to physicians to
keep people well, rather than only providing care after illness had begun.' The
federal government further supported this growth when, in 1979, an order was
issued to the American Medical Association to cease its ethical restraints on the
manner in which physicians contractedwith entities that offered medical services
to the public. 23 Corporate medicine is now accepted as a legitimate means for
delivering health care, and the federal government supports cost-containment
measures in both in-patient and out-patient settings.24 Managed care organiza-
tions have taken advantage of corporate medicine laws to avoid liability by
claiming that since corporations cannot practice medicine under these state laws,
then they, as corporations, are not practicing medicine, and therefore cannot be
held liable for medical malpractice. 2
B. What are HMOs?
The catalyst for the modem explosion of growth of HMOs was the
uncontrollable increase in the costs of health care.26 The primary goal of
HMOs is health care cost containment, with a second and separate goal of
making health care more available and more affordable to more Ameri-
for physicians to contract away their services if the contract permitted direct profit from fees, salary
or compensation from the entity employing the physician. The AMA also successfully lobbied for
legislation prohibiting corporate medicine. This type of legislation was passed in most states and
effectively restricted the growth of MCOs until the 1970s. Id. at 801-03.
20. Id. at 804.
21. Id. at 804-05. The HMO Act of 1973 encouraged the growth of HMOs by: (1) providing
seed money for the start up of non-profit HMOs, (2) requiring employers with 25 or more employees
to offer an HMO as an option if one was available in the geographical area (mandatory dual choice
requirement), and (3) ending many of the state prohibitions against corporate medicine.
22. Susan 0. Scheutzow, A Framework for Analysis of ERSA Preemption in Suits Against
Health Plans and a Callfor Reform, I I J. L. & Health 195 (1996-1997).
23. Lieberson, supra note 19, at 807. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued this Final
Order to the AMA. The FTC said that the AMA's restrictions on contract arrangements for
physicians had the following anti-competitive effects: (I) they limit price competition between
physicians by restricting them to fee-for-service and (2) they prevent creation of more economical
business structures by restricting contracts between physicians and non-physicians.
24. Id. at 808-09. Many states still have laws prohibiting the practice of corporate medicine.
25. Id. at 808-09.
26. Frank J. Vandall, An Examination of the Duty Issue in Health Care Litigation: Should
HMOs Be Liable in Tort for "Medical Necessity" Decisions?, 71 Temp. L Rev. 293, 294 (1998);
see also Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste By Making Rules: Promises, Piofalls,




cans. 27 An HMO is a type of MCO28 that provides comprehensive health care
to an enrolled membership for a fixed per capita fee.2 The common goal of
MCOs is to provide health care services at a reduced cost through consumer
competition." Arguably, IMOs can provide cost savings, and these cost
savings are attributed to the incentives created by per capita fixed fees.
3 Costs
are controlled through cost-containment strategies such as: incentives to
physicians to decrease the patient's initial use of services; fixed fees for
identified procedures; predetermined annual payment for comprehensive care
(capitation payments); and decreasedphysician involvement if over-utilization of
services by the plan participants can be demonstrated. Any or all of these may
require the physician to act as a gatekeeperby denying or restricting health care
measures requested by the patient."
MCOs create a new relationship among payors, participants and providers.
The participant pays a fixed fee to the payor (MCO) in exchange for limits on
his choice of provider. The payor accepts some of the financial risk from the
provider (physician) in exchange for some control over the way the physician
practices medicine.3 This is in contrast to the traditional relationship that
existed directly between the physician and the patient?4 When malpractice
27. Id. See also Andy Miller, Managed Care Savings Noted, Atlanta J., June 5, 1997, at.E3
(noting prediction that HMOs will save Americans up to $383 billion this decade).
28. See Thomas W. Malone and Deborah H. Thaler, Managed Health Care: A Plaintiff's
Perspective, 32 Tort & Ins. LJ. 123 (1996) (quoting John K. Inglehart, Health Care Policy
Report-Physicians and the Growth ofManaged Care, 331 New England J. Med. 1167 (1994)) (An
MCO is "a system that, in varying degrees, integrates the financing and delivery of health care
through contracts with selected physicians and hospitals that provide comprehensive health care
services to enrolled members for a predetermined... premium." (alteration in original)). See also
Scheutzow, supra note 22 (quoting from the National Association of Insurance Commission-
ers-Draft Paper on the Regulations of Risk Bearing Entities, 1996, at 1 n.3) (A managed care
organization is defined by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners as a risk bearing
entity of one or more persons that contracts with individuals, employers or other groups to arrange
for or provide health care benefits on a basis that involves the assumption of insurance risk by the
risk bearing entity.).
29. Furrow, supra note 17, at 478.
30. American College of Legal Medicine, Legal Medicine 164 (3d ed. 1995). Common
features of MCOs are: (1) they select restricted groups of health care professionals who provide
services to program participants; (2) the programs accept fixed payments by the participants in
exchange for arranging for the provision of health care (this pressures the MCO to find ways to cut
costs); and (3) they use strategies to ensure cost-effective care such as utilization review techniques,
incentives, and creating health care gatekeepers.
31. Furrow, supra note 17, at 480.
32. Legal Medicine, supra note 30.
33. Furrow, supra note 17, at 480.
34. Wayne Blackmon, The Emerging Convergence of the Doctrine of Informed Consent and
Judicial Reinterpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 19 J. Legal Med. 377
(1998). In the traditional patient-physician relationship, an independent fiduciary relationship existed
between the two parties. Under a managed care system, the HMO acts as a middleman between the
participant/patient and the network physicians. The HMO has the ability to control the physician's
access to patients and vice versa. See also Deborah W. Larios, Barbarians at the Gate? An Essay
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occurs in a traditional patient-physician relationship, direct liability exists
between the patient and the physician. In a patient-HMO-physician relationship,
however, theories of liability have become complex.
There are several kinds of HMOs, the most prevalent being staff models,
group models and network HMOs. The classification of the HMO is relevant in
suits in which the plaintiff claims the HMO was vicariously liable for the
malpractice of its employer-physician or established a relationship of ostensible
or apparent agency with its physicians."5 In a staff model HMO, the parent
company owns the health care facility, and the physicians are direct employees
who provide care to plan enrollees.36 In a group model IMO, the parent
company contracts with a medical group which, in turn, contracts with the
physicians who are paid a fixed monthly fee. 7 Finally, in a network model, the
parent company contracts with several medical groups who collectively own the
health care facility."5 The physicians provide care to plan enrollees as well as
to patients outside the HMO plan.39
C. What is ERISA?
ERISA was passed in 1974 in response to public outcry over the lack of
fairness and soundness of private retirement programs, and it was designed to
remedy certain defects in the private retirement system.40 The government had
been bombarded for years with stories of employees losing their pensions, and
the desire to protect these workers from such pension plan abuses prompted
on Payor Liability in an Era ofManaged Care, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 445 (1998). Patients are especially
vulnerable when seeking help from their physicians because of their illness or injuries. The patients
rely on their physicians to make the best decisions for medical treatment as well as to act as
advocates and advisors for any additional care. Physicians have a duty to provide quality care and
a breach of this duty can result in malpractice liability. Physicians, however, are also in the business
of running a medical practice. Under a managed care system, a physician who continues to provide
medical treatment without approval from the HMO will not receive reimbursement for that treatment.
The physician may also find himself terminated from the HMO which can significantly decrease his
patient load as well as his income. Id. at 448.




39. Id. There are also independent practice associations (IPAs) which are usually formed by
a physician's organization which contracts with an MCO to provide services to a group of enrollees,
but does not work only for the HMO. Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) are the fastest
growing type of MCO. A panel of health care providers agrees to provide services at cost in return
for the marketing advantage of being "preferred providers." The PPO enrollees' choice is not limited
to PPO physicians. There is less incentive for physicians to cut costs because the physicians do not
agree to fixed payments and they maintain their independence. Id. at 814. In a POS (point of
service) plan, the enrollee can get services from the preferred organization or from an outside
provider. A managed indemnity plan is a traditional fee-for-service plan and is not an MCO. Id.
40. Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93.406, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639.
(Vol. 59
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Congress to enact ERISA.4' ERISA was proposed to establish minimum
standards of benefit insurance to protect the security of pension rights so that an
employee covered by a pension plan became entitled to protection of his future
retirement benefits in case of termination of his employment.42 The primary
purpose of ERISA is to:
protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans...
by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants... of financial
and other information ... by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans,
and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions and ready access
to the Federal courts.43
In this way, ERISA serves to protect employers from multiple and conflicting
state regulations." ERISA does not mandate that employers provide benefit
plans, so it is up to employers to voluntarily create them for their employees.45
To encourage this development of plans, ERISA establishes uniform regulations
and imposes federal oversight of this area.46 Essentially, ERISA holds
employers to their promises when they offer employees fringe benefits and
mandates that finge benefits, such as pension plans or medical benefits, have to
be adequately funded.4 ERISA also requires that eligibility for benefits be
fairly decided, reports be filed and benefits be managedby fiduciaries answerable
to employees and to the United States Department of Labor.4"
When a dispute involves an employee benefit plan, ERISA is implicated.4'
Employee benefit plans include both welfare benefit plans and pension benefit
plans.50 Welfare benefit plans provide employees with "medical, surgical, or
hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment."51 HMOs typically contract to provide
these types of health benefits through the plan offered to employees;
therefore, IMOs have been accepted by the courts as benefit plans.5 2 So
41. Jack E. Morris, Comment, Small Employers and Group Health Insurance: Should EPJSA
Apply?, 52 La. L. Rev. 971, 976 (1992).
42. Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93.406, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4643.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1998). This statute also applies to participants' beneficiaries.
44. L. Frank Coan, Jr., You Can't Get There From Here-Questioning the Erosion of EUSA
Preemption in Medical Malpractice Actions against HMOs, 30 Ga. L Rev. 1023, 1038 (1996).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Ayling, supra note 18, at 406.
48. Id. For a discussion of the transformation of ERISA's protection of employees to
protection of employers, see supra note 33 to infra note 65 and accompanying text.
49. Coan, supra note 44, at 1039.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1998).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(IXa) (1998).
52. Coan, supra note 44, at 1039. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1998). ERISA applies to:
any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained (1) by any employer engaged in
1999]
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what does ERISA have to do with claims by patients for malpractice and
denial of coverage of HMOs?
D. Preemption
The recognition by federal judges that HMOs can qualify as ERISA plans
has created a loophole through which HMOs can avoid liability.5 3 Though
ERISA does provide employers with protection by creating uniform regulation
of benefitplans, courts and commentators have noted that the intent when ERISA
was enacted was to provide protection to employees, not to employers.5 4 As
commerce or actively affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee organization representing
employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (3) both. See
also Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 867 F.2d 489,492 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 906, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989) (The question of whether an ERISA plan exists is "a question of
fact, to be answered in light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances from the point of view
of a reasonable person."). See also Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11 th Cir. 1982)
(en bane) (A welfare benefit plan under ERISA requires five essential elements: (1) a plan, fund,
or program (2) established or maintained (3) by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both (4) for the purpose of providing medical, surgical, hospital care, sickness, accident, disability,
death, unemployment or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training program, day care centers,
scholarship funds, prepaid legal services or severance packages (5) to participants or their
beneficiaries). See, eag., Page v. Heeman, No. L-93-372, 1993 WL 818743 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 1993)
(the HMO was not an ERISA plan because it had not been "established or maintained") and Wickline
v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990) (the insurance plan was "established
and maintained" so as to be a qualified ERISA plan). See also Byard v. Qualmed Plans for Health,
Inc., 966 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (The United States Department of Labor, as authorized
by 29 U.S.C. § 1135, has promulgated regulations clarifying what "employee welfare benefit plans"
and "welfare plans" are by describing activities that do not involve employee benefit plans. These
regulations are found in 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-10) and state that group health insurance programs which
do all of the following are not employee welfare benefit plans under ERISA: (1) no contributions
are made by the employer or employee organization; (2) participation in the program is completely
voluntary for employees or members; (3) the sole functions of the employer or employee organization
with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to publicize
the program to employees or members, to collect premiums through payroll deductions or checkoffs
dues and to submit them to the insurer; and (4) the employer or employee organization receives no
consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable
compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services actually rendered in connection with
payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.). See also Kanne, 867 F.2d at 492 (if any of these elements
is missing, an employee benefit plan is subject to ERISA as a matter of law). See, e-g., Pacificare
v. Martin 34 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 1994) (for an example of application of the United States Department
of Labor's regulations). Also consider that some HMOs are federally qualified under 42 U.S.C. §
300e and federal jurisdiction may apply to these HMOs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § I 132(eXl) & (0
(1998).
53. Lieberson, supra note 19, at 810.
54. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983) (the United States
Supreme Court observed that ERISA was enacted as a "comprehensive statute designed to promote
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employees benefit plans." Id. at 90, 103 S. Ct.
at 2896.). See also Larry J. Pittman, ERISA Is Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An
Abdication ofJudicialLmv CreatingAuthority, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 355,359 (1994) (the primary purpose
(Vol. 59
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one commentator has suggested, "[i]t is difficult to discern in ERISA's goals any
congressional purpose to protect health insurers," but that has been the effect of
ERISA. 55
The McCarren-Ferguson Act granted states total control of the insurance
industry, but if the insurer is regulated by ERISA, state law is preempted by
ERISA.56 Therefore, if an HMO is a qualified ERISA plan, state law claims
against it may be preempted under the express preemption provisions of
ERISA. Since medical responsibility is governed by state malpractice laws,
claims of medical malpractice by an HMO have typically been preempted by
ERISA. 58
ERISA provides HMOs with two strong defenses against liability: complete
preemption 9 and conflict preemption.60 These are two entirely different
concepts, but are easily confused. To avoid confusion, some courts use terms
focused on removability rather than complete preemption.61 Conflict, or
ordinary, preemption however, does not confer removal jurisdiction.62 The
distinction between ordinary preemption and complete preemption is impor-
tant.63 If a state law claim falls outside the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement
of ERISA is to provide protection to employees, not to employers). See also 120 Cong. Rec. 29,935
(1975) (Sen. Javits) (at the time of its passage, ERISA was heralded as "nothing less than a pension
'bill of rights' to which every worker... is entitled"). See also 120 Cong. Rec. 29,193 (Sen Biaggi)
(it was called an employee's "emancipation proclamation"). See also Pittman, supra, at 360 (citing
savings clause and Shaw) ("There is no indication in the language of ERISA's preemption clause,
or in ERISA's legislative history, that employers and benefit plans were to obtain some self-
promoting protection for state law obligations.").
55. Ayling, supra note 18, at 407.
56. Id. The McCazren-Ferguson Act of 1945 gave the power to regulate insurance to the states.
Id. at 806. This included such regulations as controlling allowable premiums. Id. The ERISA
statute has a savings clause and a deemer clause (29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2XA) & (B) (1998)) which
work together to protect state laws that cover the "business of insurance" under the McCarren-
Ferguson Act and indirectly regulate insured, not self-funded, plans. Terese M. Connerton, Suits by
Beneficiaries Against Plans or Employers to Recover Benefits, CA23 ALI-ABA 207, 238 (1996).
However, if an ERISA plan exists and there is a claim under state law for denial of benefits or
fiduciary representations related to the ERISA plan, the claims are preempted by ERISA despite the
savings and deemer clauses.
57. Ayling, supra note 18, at 410.
58. Lieberson, supra note 19, at 810.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX1)(B) (1994) (also known as ERISA § 502(a)). "A civil action may
be brought by a participant or a beneficiary.. . to recover benefits due him under the terms of the
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of his plan, or to clarify his right to future benefits under
the plan."
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1998) (also known as ERISA § 514(a)). "Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, the provision of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall
supercede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan."
61. Thomas v. Hanley, No. Civ. A. 97-2443,1997 WL 563402, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 1997).
62. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1995).
63. Id. Typically, a plaintiff files his state law claims against his HMO in state court, usually
with no allegations concerning ERISA. The defendant/HMO removes to federal court under ERISA
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provision, the claim is not completely preempted, and federal courts are without
removal jurisdiction and cannot resolve the question of whether the claim falls
under the conflict preemption provision of ERISA.64 The significance of these
defenses is that if a plaintiffs claims are preempted by ERISA, his recovery is
severely limited by the civil enforcement provisions enumerated in ERISA.65
1. Complete Preemption
ERISA provides a civil enforcement provision which allows civil actions to
be brought against ERISA plans to: (1) recover benefits due under the plan, (2)
enforce rights under a plan, or (3) clarify rights to future benefits. 66 If the
plaintiff's claims fit within one of these categories, the suit can be removed to
federal court, and all state claims can be preempted.67 This provision provides
a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction." However, under the well-
pleaded complaint rule, removal on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction
requires that a federal question be present on the face of the plaintiff's complaint,
so a plaintiff may avoid removal by alleging only common law causes of
action.69 Theoretically, this rule makes the plaintiff the master of the claim:
the plaintiff may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law."
If the defendants assert preemption as a defense when only state law claims have
been alleged, removal should not be permitted."'
However, HMOs have traditionally been able to take advantage of an
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. This exception exists where there
is complete preemption of the state claim by congressional intent for federal
legislation to occupy an area, leaving no place for state law. 2 If there is
congressional intent to replace state law with federal law, then state law will be
completely preempted even if there is no federal claim on the face of the
complaint. 3 The exception requires a clearly manifested congressional intent
to make causes of action removable to federal court.74 "Once an area of state
based on the doctrine of complete preemption. The plaintiff moves to remand to state court on the
grounds that his claims do not fall under the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision. If
complete preemption does not apply, there is no federal jurisdiction and the case is remanded to state
court where the issue of conflict preemption is addressed and resolved. Id.
64. Id.
65. 29 U.S.C. § I132(aXi)(B) (1998).
66. Id.
67. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355.
68. Id.
69. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987).
70. Id. at 393, 107 S. Ct. at 2430.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987).




law has been completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on that
preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and
therefore arises under federal law."'5 There is complete preemption, and thus
federal removal jurisdiction, over state claims when they fall within the three
categories of ERISA's civil enforcement provision.' 6 The Supreme Court has
ruled that ERISA meets the requirements for this exception." The effect of
complete preemption is that state claims are removed to federal court where the
plaintiff is generally denied a jury trial 7 and is limited to recovering the cost
of the treatment denied because ERISA provides the exclusive remedy.'
9 The
plaintiff cannot collect damages for health problems resulting from not receiving
the treatment.'0
2. Conflict Preemption
If the state claim is not completely preempted under the civil enforcement
provision and is, therefore, not removed to federal court, the claim may still be
preempted by what is known as "conflict preemption."" This is a second line
of defense for HMOs. This provision states that ERISA "shall supercede any
and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan."' 2 The Supreme Court has decided several cases involving ERISA
preemption.' 3 Most of the ERISA cases decided by the Supreme Court
75. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S. Ct. at 2430.
76. Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hasp., No. Civ. A. 96-4858, 1998 WL 405055, at *3 n.5 (E.D.
Pa. June 30, 1998).
77. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987).
78. George D. Pozzer, Legal Aspects of Health Care Administration 158-59 (6th ed. 1996).
"The right to a trial by jury is a constitutional right in certain cases. Not all cases entitle the parties
to a jury trial as a matter of right.... [The function of] the jury is to make a determination of the
facts that have occurred, evaluate whether the plaintiff's damages were caused by the defendant and
whether the defendant exercised due care. The jury makes a determination in the particular standard
of conduct required in all cases in which the judgement of reasonable people might differ.... The
jury also determines the extent of damages, if any, and the degree to which the plaintiff's conduct
may have contributed to his or her injury." rd. See also Lieberson, supra note 19, at 662. ERISA
does not expressly provide for trial by jury for any of the causes of action it creates. The majority
of courts have held that benefit claims and claims for breach of fiduciary duty are equitable in nature
and there is no right to trial by jury. See also Sofo v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 13 F.3d 239 (7th
Cir. 1994).
79. 29 U.S.C. § l132(aXI)(B) (1998).
80. Neville M. Bilimorin, Comment, Beware HlMOs: The Future ofHMO Medical Malpractice
Liability is Uncertain, 1 DePaul J. Health Care L. 711, 716 (1997).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, 519 U.S. 316,
117 S. Ct. 832 (1997). See also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997); DeBuono
v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 117 S. Ct. 1747 (1997); New York
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671
(1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Say. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 114 S. Ct. 517
1999]
LOUISIANA LW REVIEW
involved the scope of the term "relates to" and "the Court has struggled. . . with
the inherent vagueness of that key statutory phrase.""' The Supreme Court has
variously described the ERISA preemption clause as having a "broad scope, and
an expansive sweep, and [as being] broadly worded, deliberately expansive, and
conspicuous for its breadth."85 Under the Court's early test, developed in Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,86 ERISA conflict preemption hinged on whether the
state law related to an ERISA plan-that is, did the state law have a connection
with or a reference to an ERISA plan? This test was later expanded to include
preemption of all state laws that indirectly affected benefit plans."7
Under this early analysis of "relates to," federal courts found that most state
law claims against ERISA plans fell within one of the three categories of claims
in the civil enforcement statute which resulted in removal and complete
preemption of the state law claims. 8 Even if the state claims were found not
to be completely preempted and were remanded to state court, the breadth of the
meaning of the "relates to" clause allowed the state courts to find that the HMOs
were immune from liability under the concept of conflict preemption. 9
Although ERISA preemption was expansive under this early Shaw analysis, it
was recognized that "[s]ome state actions may affect employee benefit plans in
too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law
'relates to' a plan,"' 9 and some claims against HMOs have succeeded. HMOs
have been found liable under principles of agency, vicarious liability, corporate
negligence and claims of breach of contract and unfair trade practices. Claims
(1993); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 113 S. Ct 580(1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990); FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 111 S. CL 403 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 109 S. Ct.
1668 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Ser,., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108 S. Ct. 2182(1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 107 S. CL 2211 (1987); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S. Ct.
2380 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983); and Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 101 S. Ct. 1895 (1981).
84. Howard Shapiro et al., ERISA Preemption: To Infinity and Beyond and Back Again? (
Historical Review of Supreme Court Jurisprudence), 58 La. L Rev. 997, 1001 (1998).
85. Dllingham, 519 U.S. at 321, 117 S. Ct. at 837 (internal citations omitted).
86. 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
87. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990).
88. See, eg., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1033, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1993) (holding ERISA preempted state claims against
utilization manager under employer's self-insured plan); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d
298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994) (holding ERISA preempted
state claims for delay in scheduling deceased's heart surgery).
89. Barry B. Cepelewics et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 33 Tort& Ins. LJ.
583 (1998). See also Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996) (the court
held that a vicarious liability claim against the health plan was not completely preempted, but "related
to" an ERISA plan so was preempted under conflict preemption).
90. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1329 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100, 103 S. Ct. at 2901 n.21.
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for denial of benefits and breach of fiduciary duty, though, have traditionally
been found to be preempted by ERISA.9'
M1. THEORIES OF RECoVERY AGAINST HMOS
A. Vicarious Liability and Ostensible/Apparent Agency Claims
The theory behind vicarious liability, or respondeat superior, is that the
employer is liable for the acts of his employees if committed within the course
and scope of employment.9" The test for determining if there is an employer-
employee relationship focuses on the amount of control the employer exercises
over the employee.93 In a health care setting, if the health care institution has
substantial control over the physician's choice of patients or furnishes the
physician with equipment, an employer-employee relationship exists.94 "Courts
look at the operation of the HMO and determine if it conducts itself in a fashion
akin to a health care provider," and if the answer is yes, the HMO is subject to
the same liability as a hospital.95 For example, in Robbins v. HIP of New
Jersey,9 Lorraine Robbins died after being diagnosed and treated for breast
cancer. Her husband sued the HMO for professional negligence.97 The court
stated there was no policy against holding an HMO liable under respondeat
superior if the actual health care provider was directly employed by the lIMO.
9
If there is no direct control, and thus no vicarious liability, the court may
find that an agency relationship exists.99 If a plan sponsor/employer has created
an expectation on the part of the patient that the plan will make available high-
quality providers of care, then there may be ostensible or apparent agency.t
°°
91. See, eg., Corcoran, 965 F.2d 1321 (a denial of benefits claim is preempted by ERISA).
See also infra notes 150-160 and accompanying text for discussion of breach of fiduciary duty
claims.
92. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 500 (5th ed. 1984).
93. Id.
94. Furrow, supra note 17, at 483. See also Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council of
Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (nd. App. Ct. 1987) OHMO may be held vicariously liable
for the acts of employee physicians when the usual requisites of agency or employer-employee
relationship exist); Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (HMO not
vicariously liable because no right of control over physician's professional conduct); Williams v.
Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 1988) (no liability for agency or respondeat
superior where the physicians were independent contractors); Schlier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan
of the Mid-Atantic States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (HMO was vicariously liable for its
consulting physician even though physician was an independent contractor because HMO had some
ability to control physician's actions).
95. Furrow, supra note 17, at 484.
96. 625 A.2d 45, 47 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Prosser, supra note 92, at 508.
100. Furrow, supra note 17, at 483.
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Likewise, if the plan restricts the choice of providers, the providers may look
like agents."'
In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 2 the decedent, Mrs. Boyd, and
her husband were participants in an HMO as provided by his employer. The
Boyds, restricted to physicians listed as participating in the HMO, selected
primary care physicians from the list."0 Mrs. Boyd subsequently became ill
and required a surgical biopsy after which she was sent home.'" Once home,
Mrs. Boyd experienced chest pain."5 She was examined in the emergency
room and was again sent home where she later expired after suffering a heart
attack.'" Mr. Boyd sued the HMO on theories of vicarious liability and
ostensible agency. 0 7 He alleged that the HMO had advertised that its physi-
cians and health care providers were competent and had been evaluated prior to
being selected to participate in the HMO."' The trial court granted a motion
for summary judgement for the HMO based on the plaintiff's failure to establish
an agency relationship."° The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, however, after
describing the relationship between the HMO and its physicians, held that an
issue of material fact did exist, reversed the trial court's order and remanded the
case." 0 The court noted that to determine if a treating physician is an ostensi-
ble agent, the court must consider whether the patient looks to the institution,
rather than to the individual physician for care and whether the HMO holds the
physician out as its employee."'
B. Corporate Negligence Claims
Corporations, such as health care organizations, can also be held liable for
the negligent selection, retention and supervision of their employees." A
health care organization has a duty to its patients to ensure the competency of its
medical staff and the quality of medical care provided through prudent selection,
review and continuing evaluation of the physicians granted staff privileges." 3
This duty extends to HMOs, which owe their plan participants a duty to select
competent health care providers." 4 This is a strong duty because the patient
101. Id. at 486.










112. Furrow, supra note 17, at 483.




has selected the HMO, but not the physicians, and the patient relies on the HMO
for the selection of the physicians who will provide care as part of the HMO's
services."15 In addition, a failure to implement proper procedures to detect
problems with physicians could lead to direct liability."
6
In McClellan v. HMO of Pennsylvania,"" Mrs. McClellan, as a member
of the defendant HMO, selected her primary care physician from the provided
list."' The physician removed a mole from Mrs. McClellan's back and
discarded it without further testing despite reports that the mole had recently
changed in size and color." 9 Mrs. McClellan subsequently died from malig-
nant melanoma that was not timely diagnosed or treated. Her husband sued the
HMO under a theory of corporate negligence.'20 The trial court dismissed the
claim, but on appeal, this decision was reversed and remanded.'' The
appellate court found the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a cause
of action for negligence in the selection, retention and/or evaluation of the
primary care physician.'" The court relied on Section 323 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and found that a complaint sufficiently sets out a cause of
action if it establishes that: (1) an HMO has undertaken to provide services to
the patient; (2) the HMO should recognize the services are necessary for the
protection of the patient; (3) the HMO failed to exercise reasonable care in
selecting, retaining and/or evaluating the primary care physician; and (4) the
failure resulted in an increased risk of harm to the patient.'"
C. Breach of Contract and Unfair Trade Practices Claims
Claims for recovery for breach of contract or claims that allege unfair trade
practices are non-negligence claims."2 Under the early, broad interpretation
115. Id. See also Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989) (claim of
malpractice that HMO was negligent in its selection of the surgeon who was incompetent and treated
patient was exempt).
116. Id. See also Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs claim
of negligence against the benefitplan for negligent hiring and negligent supervision of physician who
engaged in negligent treatment and misuse of privileged information not preempted by ERISA).
117. 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. 1992).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. Mr. McClellan also sued the defendant HMO on theories of ostensible agency and
misrepresentation. These claims were also dismissed by the trial court which was reversed on appeal.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 provides: "One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection
of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care
increased the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking."
124. Lieberson, supra note 19, at 965.
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of ERISA, some courts found that these claims were not related to ERISA
plans.' For instance, the court in Smith v. HMO Great Lakes2 6 found that
the plaintiffs' state law negligence claims were based on a contractual relation-
ship between the HMO and the physicians and this did not "relate to" an ERISA
plan, so the claims were therefore not preempted. In this case, the Smiths were
participants in IMO Great Lakes.'2 7 The HtMO contracted with the communi-
ty hospital to provide services to the plan participants. ' Mrs. Smith delivered
a child by caesarean birth at the hospital after the infant suffered from fetal
distress.'" The Smiths alleged this distress resulted in severe disabilities in the
child. 3 The Smiths sued the HMO based on a breach of contract between the
HMO and the hospital for failure to provide reasonable care.' 3'
In Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook Life Insurance Co., 132 the Fifth
Circuit recognized that claims of deceptive and unfair trade practices are not
preempted by ERISA. In this case, Mr. Echols and his family were participants
in the HMO provided by his employer.. The agreement was that there would
be no coverage by the health plan until the employee had worked for the
employer for thirty days.3 4 Mrs. Echols began receiving medical treatment
from Memorial Hospital before Mr. Echols had worked the required amount of
time. 13  However, prior to providing treatment, Memorial Hospital had
telephoned the HMO to verify coverage and was assured that Mrs. Echols was
covered by the HMO.136 Relying on this representation, the hospital provided
approximately $110,000 worth of medical services. The Echols assigned their
rights to Memorial, but when the hospital requestedpayment from the HMO, the
request was denied based on lack of coverage. The hospital sued the HMO on
theories of negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract and deceptive and
unfair trade practices.'37 The trial court dismissed the breach of contract and
unfair trade practice claims as preempted by ERISA, but stated the negligent
misrepresentation claim was not "related to" an ERISA plan. 3 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the breach of contract claim, but
125. See also Memorial Hosp. Systemy. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990)(claim by a hospital against HMO for unfair trade practices not preempted by ERISA, but claims
based on breach of contract, fraud or misrepresentations are preempted).















reversed the dismissal of the unfair trade practices claim as not preempted by
ERISA.
139
In addition to breach of contract claims and unfair trade practices claims,
breach of warranty claims may arise from the language of an HMO brochure if
there is a promise of quality care."" For example, in a concurring opinion in
Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center,'"" the judge noted the literature
distributed by the HMO to its participants "guaranteed" and "assured" the quality
of care that would be provided. Based on this language, the judge noted that the
plaintiff's complaint supported a breach of warranty claim against the HMO.
D. Utilization Review and Denial of Benefits Claims
Since the passage of ERISA, the health care delivery system has evolved
from a fee-for-service system to one of managed care. 4" In managed care, the
health care services considered for a patient are reviewed prospectively or
concurrently in order to determine if the medical treatment is necessary."'
This is known as utilization review, and the purpose is to contain health care
costs by limiting or rationing the amount of health care available to plan
participants.'" If it is deemed to be unnecessary, the service or payment for the
service may be denied, and this denial of health care services can result in injury
or death to the patient/participant. 145 It is this review process that has led to
the question of whether HMOs are providing medical care when they make
medical-necessity decisions for which they can be held liable for medical malpractice.1'
139. Id.
140. Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 Ald 1229 (Pa. 1988) (McEwen, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. Suzanne M. Grosso, Rethinking Malpractice Liability and ERISA Preemption in the Age
of Managed Care, 9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 433,434 (1998). When ERISA was enacted, health plans
did not act as providers of care. Health care was delivered on a fee-for-service system in which the
patient received services and the health plan retrospectively reviewed and paid for those services.
With retrospective review, treatment could not be denied since it had already been provided, so the
patient's health was not endangered.
143. J. Scott Andresen, Comment, Is Utilization Review the Practice of Medicine?, 19 3. Legal
Med. 431 (1998). Concurrent review is an ongoing review of the cost and quality of care for a
particular patient. Id. at 434. Prospective review requires preauthorization before a physician may
deliver medical care. Id. See also Vandall, supra note 26, at 1654 (citing Institute of Medicine,
Controlling Costs and Changing Patient Care? The Role of Utilization Management 3, 17-18
(Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Fields eds. 1989)) (noting the overall percentage of denied requests
under a prospective review system is only one to two percent and that, often, medical necessity
reviews are performed by insurance clerks with no formal medical training).
144. Andresen, supra note 143, at 432.
145. Id. at 435. Under ERISA, the patient and/or his survivors are left without an adequate
remedy against the health plan because they are limited to recovering the actual cost of the benefit
denied. 29 U.S.C. § I132(aXl) (1994).
146. Vandall, supra note 26, at 301. HMOs have rigorously argued against the idea that they
are practicing medicine and are adamantly opposed to judicial review of their utilization review
decisions. Id. If a medical malpractice claim is removed to federal court, there is no judicial review
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The confusion giving rise to this question results from the dual roles that
HMOs play. Initially, newly created ERISA-qualified health plans only acted to
coordinate health care services, but gradually, dual roles were created by HMOs:
as providers of health care and as administrators of benefit plans. '47 These roles
developed when HMOs contracted with employers to provide health insurance to
the employees, then offered to administer these plans for the employers. 4"
Traditionally, courts did not distinguish between these two roles, and under the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of what "related to" an ERISA plan, most
state claims against ERISA plans were found to be preempted. 149 However,
courts are now beginning to carefully delineate the boundaries of these two roles.
As administrators, the health plans have become ERISA fiduciaries.' 0
ERISA protects fiduciaries from negligence actions, but does not afford
protection for "providers.''. Physicians, hospitals, and other direct providers
of medical care have typically not been deemed fiduciaries whose standards of
conduct are defined and liability limited by federal law. 152  "Fiduciary," as
used in ERISA, is construed broadly. " If a person or entity is deemed a
fiduciary under ERISA, claims of breach of fiduciary duty will be preempted and
recovery will be limited by ERISA.'" A fiduciary's conduct, alone, may be
of the decision, but if it is remanded to state court, decisions to deny health care will be reviewed
by the courts. Id. at 310. The function of judicial review through a tort suit is to encourage the
HMO to make a reasonable decision on patient treatment by considering factors other than profit.
Id. at 301. One of the arguments against judicial review is that the courts are not technically trained
to understand complex medical issues, but courts deal with complex medical, scientific and
technological issues every day. Id. at 307.
147. Ayling, supra note 18, at 407.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 53-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's
analysis of ERISA's preemption clause.
150. See generally E. Haavi Morreim, Benefits Decisions in ERISA Plans: Diminishing
Deference to Fiduciaries and an Emerging Problem for Provider-Sponsored Organizations, 65 Tenn.
L. Rev. 511 (1998) (a general discussion of fiduciary status and duty under ERISA). See also
Bakker et al., ERISA Fiduciary Duty Litigation Afler Varity Corporation v. Howe, SCO8 ALI-ABA
117 (1997) (discussion of development of case law regarding breach of fiduciary status under
ERISA); see also Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998) (a'recent application of the
analysis for a proper claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA).
151. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
152. Stephen D. Kinnard, Judicial Refusal to Apply ERISA Preemption to Tort Actions Against
Health Care Providers, The Brief, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1997) at.26. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2lXa)
(1998) (A person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan "to the extent [that] he exercises any
discretionary authority or control respecting management of [the] plan or... respecting management
or disposition of its assets... or he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility
in the administration of such plan.").
153. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting from a statement by the
Chairman of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 120 Cong. Rec. 3977,3983 (Feb. 25, 1974)).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1998). See also Pegram, 154 F.3d at 371 (To properly state a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendants are plan
fiduciaries; (2) the defendants breached their fiduciary duties; and (3) a cognizable loss resulted.).
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enough to impose a fiduciary duty.t'" These duties are breached if the
fiduciary acts to benefit his own interests.156 A fiduciary who breaches his
duty can be held liable to the plan for losses caused by the breach or for
equitable or remedial relief." ERISA allows any plan beneficiary to sue any
plan fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty.158 A plan participant may bring an
action for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of the plan itself, but any recovery
inures to the plan. 5 9 An action may also be brought on behalf of the partici-
pant who is limited to recovering equitable relief.'6"
Claims against HMOs in their second role as providers of care, such as
injuries resulting from denial of benefits, have traditionally been found to be
preempted under ERISA. However, recent Supreme Court and federal courts of
appeals decisions have demonstrated a trend in allowing state claims to survive
ERISA preemption.
IV. WINDS OF CHANGE
Under the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the "relates to" provision,
claims of negligence for injuries resulting from denial of benefits, or improper
utilization review, have almost always been completely preempted under the civil
enforcement provision. 6' These claims were typically found by the courts to
155. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § l104(aXIXA) (1998) (Under ERISA, a "fiduciary shall discharge
his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries and for
the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to [them] and defraying the reasonable expenses of
administering the plan.").
156. Pegram, 154 F.3d at 371. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(B) (1998) (These duties will be
discharged by the fiduciary "with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use.").
157. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1998) ("Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use
of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief
as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.').
158. 29 U.S.C. § l132(aX3XA) (1998) provides that a plan participant, beneficiary or fiduciary
may bring a civil action to "enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA] or
the terms of the plan, or to obtain other appropriate relief to redress such violations or to enforce any
provision of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan."
159. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX2) (1998). See also Bagsby v. Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 162 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 1998); Dittman v. Dyno Nobel, Inc., No. 97-
CV-1724, 1998 WL 865603 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998).
160. See 29 U.S.C. § I132(aX3) (1998). See also Allinder v. Inter-City Products Corp., 152
F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that equitable relief does not include punitive or compensatory
damages, but is instead similar to injunctions or restitution).
161. See also Memorial Hosp. System v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990)
(claims by plan participant alleging improper processing of a claim for plan benefits is preempted
by ERISA); but see Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. 1987) (third party payors can be held
accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or implementa-
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be for "recover[y] [of] benefits due under the plan, to enforce rights under a
plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits,"'62 or they were claims for negli-
gence resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty in administering the plan. 63
Thus, once preempted, the plaintiff could only recover the cost of the benefit
denied.'" However, recent Supreme Court decisions have limited the scope of
the "relates to" provision. 6 As a result, more suits alleging state claims of
negligence or malpractice by HMOs are surviving complete preemption and are
being remanded to state court. 66 "Commentators and case law show that when
cases are remanded to state courts, even though conflict preemption may be
available as a defense, state courts are disinclined to offer immunity to
HMOs.' 67
A. Judicial Changes
1. United States Supreme Court
In New York State Conference ofBlue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.16 in 1995, the Supreme Court noted that the phrase "relates to"
had previouslybeen given a broad, textual meaning. Justice Souter concludedthat
the text of the ERISA. preemption clause "could not be read to extend to the
furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, [or] for all practical purposes, preemption
would never run its course for [r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere."' 169
Since its decisions in Travelers and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has
provided more concrete guidelines regarding the scope of "relates to" preemp-
tion.170 The two-prong test formulated in Shaw v. Delta remains intact-a state
law relates to ERISA if it: (1) has a reference to or (2) a connection with an
ERISA plan, unless the relation is "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral."'
However, in Travelers and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has put
limitations on what references and connections are sufficient to find that the state
tion of cost-containment measures and cf. Wilson v. Blue Cross of So. Calif., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 4574 (Oct. 11, 1990) (limits the holding in
Vrickline to non-private sector).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1998).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aX2) (1998).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(aXl)(B) (1998).
165. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
166. Walter E. Schuler, Note, The ERISA Preemption Narrows: Analysis of New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and Its Impact on
State Regulations of Health Care, 40 St. Louis U. LJ. 783, 822-23 (1996).
167. Neville M. Bilimorin, Comment, Beware HMOs: The Future ofHMO MedicalMalpractice
Liabiliy Is Uncertain, I DePaul J. Health Care L. 711, 717 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
168. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671.
169. Id. (quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed.) World Classics 1980).
170. Id.
171. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 n.21, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2901 n.21 (1983).
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law actually "relates to" an ERISA plan. 72 Thus, under the first prong of the
Shaw test, there is no "reference to" an ERISA plan ff the state law does not act
immediately or exclusively on an ERISA plan, or where the existence of an
ERISA plan is not essential to the state law's operation."7 3 Under this new
analysis, state laws that have only an indirect economic impact on ERISA plans
will not necessarily be preempted.
174
Under the second prong of Shaw, to determine if a state law has the
forbidden connectionwith an ERISA plan, the Supreme Court has looked beyond
the text of ERISA.'"7 Courts must now consider "the objectives of the ERISA
statute as a guide to the scope of state law that Congress understood would
survive" and the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.7 6 State
laws that expressly refer to ERISA will still be superceded by ERISA."'
To support this new analysis, the Supreme Court has described the purpose
of ERISA as being to "avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the
nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans."'7 This is
accomplished through "reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the
like."'74 9 Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted that in cases where federal law
is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation, there is an
"assumption that the historic police powers of the states [are] not to be
superceded by the federal act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."'3 0 If it is a field traditionally occupied by the states, there is a
considerable burden in overcoming the presumption that Congress does not
intend to supplant state law.'
The historic police powers of a state include the regulation of matters of
health and safety." 2 The Court has noted that the preemptive reach of ERISA
and the words "relate to" would limit nothing if ERISA were concerned with any
state action potentially affecting the choices made by ERISA plans, such as
standards for medical care quality or hospital workplace regulations that would
increase costs of providing certain benefits."' If ERISA were read as preempt-
172. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671. In concurrence, Justice Scalia said that
"applying the 'relates to' provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, as
many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else."
173. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcementv. DillinghamConstruction, 519 U.S. 316,
117 S. Ct. 832, 837-38 (1997).
174. Id.
175. Travelers, 514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671.
176. Id. at 656, 115 S. CL. 1677.
177. De Buono v. NYSA-IL..A Med. and Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 117 S. Ct. 1747
(1997).
178. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655, 115 S. Ct. at 1677.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. De Buono, 520 U.S. 806, 117 S. Ct. 1747.
182. Id.
183. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, 519 U.S. 316,
117 S. Ct. 832 (1997) (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. 645, 115 S. Ct. 1671).
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ing all state laws even indirectly related to ERISA plans, this would
effectively read the limiting language out of the statute. 4 This "conclu-
sion.., would violate basic principles of statutory interpretation and could
not be squared with [the Supreme Court's] prior pronouncement that
'[p]reemption does not occur... if the state law has only a tenuous...
connection with covered plans, as is the case with many laws of general
applicability."""5
The Supreme Court's most recent action regarding the issue of ERISA
preemption was to grant certiorari in Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v.
Ward.'" In this case, the plaintiff, John Ward, became disabled in 1992 and
notified his company's human resources department.'87 Mr. Ward claimed his
company failed to tell him he qualified for disability insurance through Unum,
the defendant.' 8 After the deadline had passed for applying for benefits, Mr.
Ward discovered a brochure from which he learned he qualified for benefits." 9
He then applied for benefits, but was denied.'" The basis of Mr.
Ward's claim was a California law that said if an insurer does not have
an agent in the workplace, then the company's personnel department acts
as the insurer's agent.' Under this law, Mr. Ward's original notifica-
tion to his company's human resources department was timely. 9 The
lower court found these claims were preempted by ERISA.' 93 The Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded on the basis of another California law
which states that insurers may not deny a claim that is not timely without
reviewing the merits of the case. 94 In addition, the insurer must prove
that the insurance company was prejudiced by the claimant missing the
deadline. 9 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine if
ERISA should override state laws.'96
2. Federal Circuit Courts
Following the Supreme Court's lead, some federal circuits have
developed their own tests for determining the reach of preemption under
ERISA.
184. 7Tavelers, 514 U.S. at 661,115 S. CL at 1679; see also 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) (1994).
185. Id. (citation omitted).
186. 135 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 334 (1998).




191. Unum, 135 F.3d at 1279.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1280.
195. Id.
196. 119 S. Ct. 334 (1998).
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a. Third Circuit: Quality v. Quantity Test
Shortly after the Travelers ruling by the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit
decided Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare'97 in which two IMOs were sued for
malpractice. Because the plaintiffs' complaints did not attack the erroneous
withholding of benefits by the HMOs, the court, on appeal, held the state
claims were not completely preempted and remanded the cases to state
court. 
93
In both suits, the plaintiffs alleged the HIMOs were negligent under theories
of ostensible agency and for the negligent selection, retention and supervision of
the medical personnel who provided the negligent health care. The Third Circuit
distinguished allegations regarding the quantity of service from allegations about
the quality of service. The court noted that to be completely preempted, the
complaint, on its face, must be for claims "to recover benefits due him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify
his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."199 The plaintiffs, and
the United States Department of Labor as amicus curiae, viewed these claims as
simply attacks on the behavior of the HMOs which was separate from the
administration of the ERISA plan.2" The defendant HMOs argued that the
claims of negligence and agency only related to the quality of the plan
benefits and the HMOs' roles in arranging those benefits.01 The court
assumed that if the complaints had alleged that the HMOs refused to
provide the services to which membership in the plans entitled the
plaintiffs, the claims would be preempted. °2 However, the court agreed
with the plaintiffs and the Department of Labor, stating "the plaintiffs here
simply do not claim that the plans erroneously withheld benefits due. Nor
do they ask the state courts to enforce their rights under the terms of
their respective plans or to clarify their rights to future benefits. 203
Rather, the plaintiffs complained about the low quality of the medical
treatment that they actually received.24
The Third Circuit then applied the rules of statutory construction and
determined that Section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA said nothing about the quality
of benefits received, but was concerned exclusively with whether or not the
197. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009,116 S. Ct. 564(1995). Two cases were
consolidated and were heard on an appeal of the district courts' dismissals of motions to remand to
state court. The district courts had found the plaintiffs' claims were completely preempted by
ERISA.
198. Id.
199. 29 U.S.C. § I132(aXl)(B) (1998).







benefits due under the plan were actually provided." 5 The court also conclud-
ed that nothing in the legislative history, structure, or purpose of ERISA
suggested that Congress intended this complete preemption provision to create
a remedy for a plan participant injured by medical malpractice.2 Quality
control is a field traditionally occupied by state regulation, and the Third Circuit
interpreted congressional silence as reflecting an intent that it remain as such.207
The Third Circuit also recognized that HMOs play two roles: as utilization
reviewers and as arrangers of medical treatment. ' It is only in the role as
utilization reviewer that an entity is in a position to deny benefits under an
ERISA plan.2"9 In these cases, the plaintiffs were attempting to hold the
HMOs liable for their roles as arrangers of medical treatment, and not in the
roles of utilization reviewers.210 Furthermore, the court said, "[P]atients enjoy
the right to be free from medical malpractice regardless of whether or not their
medical care is provided through an ERISA plan. 21'
This "quality versus quantity" test has been followed in recent Third Circuit
cases to determine if state claims against ERISA plans are completely preempted.
For example, in Eaccarino v. Canlas,212 the plaintiff alleged that the treating
physicians were negligent in failing to order appropriate testing and that these
physicians were ostensible agents of the HMO. The case was removed to federal
court, but was remanded. 23 The court found these claims were not completely
preempted because there was no allegation that the HMO was liable because of
refusal to provide a benefit due under the plan or that the ]HMO had any role in
directing the plaintiff's medical treatment.2 4 The court noted that, "under well
settled precedent, such garden variety medical malpractice claims do not
implicate complete preemption doctrine." ' s
b. Fifth Circuit: Sommers Test
The Fifth Circuit has created its own two-part test for determining when a
relationship to an ERISA plan is "too tenuous." This test was established in
205. Id. at 357.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 361.
209. Id. at 360.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 358.
212. No. 97-CV-5497, 1998 WL 195875 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1998).
213. Id. at *4.
214. Id.
215. Id. See also Huss v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 400 (D.Del. 1998);
Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., I F. Supp. 2d 420 (D.N.J. 1998); Newton v. Tavani, 962 F. Supp.
45 (D.N.J. 1997); Katlin v. Tremoglie, No. 97-4450, 1997 WL 548932 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1997);
Kapka v. Hornstein, No. 97-1261, 1997 WL 381762 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 1997).
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Sommers Drug Stores Co. v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc.2 6 In this case, the
plaintiff, an employee profit-sharing trust, sued the defendants for breach of
fiduciary duties under ERISA.217 At trial, the jury found the defendants had
breached their fiduciary duties and awarded the plaintiffs punitive damages.2 8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded because ERISA does not
provide for these types of damages for breach of fiduciary duty.219 To guide
the lower court, the Fifth Circuit carefully described a two-pronged test to be
used for determining if a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan in "too tenuous"
a way.220 If the relationship is found to be "too tenuous," the state law will
not be preempted by ERISA."
The elements of the Sommers test are: (1) if a state law does not fall within
an area of exclusive federal concern or the state law involves an exercise of
traditional state authority, it is less likely the state law will be found to be related
to an ERISA plan; and/or (2) if the state law directly affects the relationship
between the principal entities (the employer, the plan, the fiduciary, and the
participant and beneficiaries), then it is more likely to relate to an ERISA
plan.' To determine whether a claim falls within an area of exclusive federal
concern or is an exercise of traditional state authority, the Fifth Circuit
recognized that Congress' intent in enacting ERISA was the "ultimate touch-
stone."' The court clarified the purpose of ERISA as being to "promote the
welfare of employees and their beneficiaries by protecting their contract defined
benefits" and noted that a party's recovery is limited under the civil enforcement
provision of ERISA." 4 Therefore, under the first prong of the Sommers test,
claims which allege that an ERISA plan denied a participant benefits may more
likely be preempted by ERISA. 2
Under the second prong of the test, a court must identify under what
capacity the claim affects the parties.' 6 A state claim may affect the relations
of parties who are principal entities, but in capacities that are not governed by
ERISA, such as a patient-provider relationship.227 Under part two of the
Sommers test, the question, then, is not whether the state law nominally affects
216. 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034, 107 S. Ct. 884 (1987).
217. Id. at 1457.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1459.
220. Id. at 1465.
221. Id.
222. Blum v. Harris Methodist Health Plan, No. 3:97-CV-0374P, 1997 WL 452750, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. July 31, 1997) (citing Sommers Drug Stores Co. v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1466-
67 (5th Cir. 1986)).
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113-13, 109 S. Ct. 948
(1989)).
225. Id.
226. Sommers, 793 F.2d at 1467-68.
227. Blum, 1997 WL 452750 at *2.
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the relationship between parties who happen to be principal entities, but whether
the state claim affects the duties of the principal entities which arose from the
terms of the benefit plan.2" '
This test has been applied by lower courts in recent negligence suits against
HIMOs .2 9  For example, in Blum v. Harris Methodist Health Plan, Inc., 0
the plaintiffs alleged claims that related to the quality of the medical services
provided by the HMO. The plaintiffs claimed that the HMO had a duty as a
provider of medical care, and this duty was breached."' The court applied the
Sommers test and found that this duty arose independently of the terms of the
plan, so this was not an area of exclusive federal control and part one of the
Sommers test was not met.2 2 To meet the second prong of the test, the court
examined whether the plaintiff's claims affected the relationship between the
parties in their capacities as principal entities. 3 The court found that the
plaintiffs' claims of negligence and medical malpractice only affected the patient-
provider relationship and not the fiduciary-participant relationship, so part two
of the test was also not met."' Because the plaintiffs' claims were too tenuous
to be related to an ERISA plan and were, therefore, not preempted by ERISA,
the court granted the motion to remand to state court.235
228. Id.
229. Note, however, that Louisiana courts most often cite the Sommers test when a state claim
is found to be preempted and Texas courts most often cite this test when state claims are found not
to be preempted. See, eg., Bricklayers Local No. 1 Welfare Fund v. Louisiana Health Ins. Assoc.,
771 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. La. 1991) and Marano v. Seafarers Int'l Union, No. 87-5646, 1988 WL
98244 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 1988) (state law claims found to "relate to" an ERISA plan and were
preempted). But cf. New Orleans Sheet Metal Worker's Local 11 Health & Welfare Fund v. ABC
Ins. Co., No. 90-1889,1990 WL 103118 (E.D. La. July 16,1990) (relationship between attorney and
client did not relate to an ERISA plan). See also Barringer v. Parker Bros. Employee Retirement
Fund, 877 F. Supp. 358 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Westbrook v. Beverly Enters., 832 F. Supp. 188 (W.D.
Tex. 1993); Roney v. Nationsbank Corp., 799 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (state law claims did
not relate to an ERISA plan under Sommers test); and Eurine v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc., No. 3-91-
0408-H, 1991 WL 207468 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 1991).
230. No. 3:97-CV-0374P, 1997 WL 452750 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 1997). See also Cyr v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan of Texas, 12 F. Supp 2d 556 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (Plaintiffs alleged the HMOs,
while providing medical care, were negligent in failing to properly diagnose and treat serious physical
ailments. Neither plaintiff alleged a claim based on improper denial of benefits. The court applied
the Sommers test and found: (1) that because the plaintiffs' claims of medical malpractice alleged
that the HMOs had a duty as providers of care that arose outside the terms of the plan, these claims
did not involve an area of exclusive federal concern; and (2) the plaintiffs' claims of negligence and
medical malpractice did not directly affect the relationship between the principal entities, but only
affected the relationship between the parties as provider of care and patient. Because neither prong
of the Sommers test was met, the claims were "too tenuous" to relate to an ERISA plan and were,
therefore, not preempted.).




235. Id. at *4.
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The Fifth Circuit and lower courts, however, have applied this test
inconsistently. In Sommers, for example, the Fifth Circuit based its decision
solely on the second prong of the Sommers test after reasoning that the first
factor was unsupported by the broad language of ERISA. 6  However, in
Memorial Hospital System v. Northbrook Life Insurance Co., 237 the same court
relied on both prongs of the Sommers test to determine that a state law was not
related to an ERISA plan. In addition, there are cases in which the Fifth Circuit
has decided preemption issues without relying on the Sommers test at all.238
Finally, the Fifth Circuit's oft-cited decision in Corcoran v. United Healthcare,
Inc."39 has placed limits on the usefulness of the Sommers test in denial of
benefits cases. In Corcoran, a claim alleging injuries resulting from a denial of
benefits was found to "relate to" an ERISA plan and was preempted.2 0 The
district court reasoned that under the Sommers test "but for the ERISA plan, the
defendants would have played no role... [ and] the ERISA plan was the source
of the relationship between the [plaintiff] and the defendants;" therefore, the
plaintiffs claim directly affected a relationship between ERISA entities and was
preempted.241' The Fifth Circuit, however, distinguished the relationship
between the parties in Corcoran from the relationship between the parties in
Sommers and therefore found that Sommers did not mitigate ERISA preemption
in this case.242
c. Ninth Circuit: Relationship Test
The Ninth Circuit has developed its own "relationship" test for determining
243Athe limits of ERISA preemption. In General American Life Insurance Co.
v. Castognguay,24 the Ninth Circuit first stated that a state law claim is
preempted if it "encroaches on the relationships regulated by ERISA." The key
issue under this test is whether the parties' relationships are ERISA-governed
236. Sommers Drug Stores Co. v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986).
See also Eurine v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc., No. 3-91-0408-H, 1991 WL 207468, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
21, 1991).
237. 904 F.2d 236, 245 (5th Cir. 1990).
238. See, eg., Cefalu v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989).
239. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992) (Mrs.
Corcoran brought a claim of malpractice for denial of benefits against her HMO after losing her
unborn child. Her physician had requested that Mrs. Corcoran be put on bedrest in the hospital
because of a high-risk pregnancy. Her health plan, however, refused to authorize hospitalization, but
agreed to pay for home health nurse visits. At a time when no nurse was present, Mrs. Corcoran
went into premature labor and subsequently lost her child.).
240. Id. at 1325.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1334.
243. Geweke Ford v. St. Joseph's Omni Preferred Care Inc., 130 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.
1997).
244. 984 F.2d 1518, 1522 (9th Cir. 1993).
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relationships.24 This test was applied in Geweke Ford v. St. Joseph's Omni
Preferred Care Inc.246 The Ninth Circuit reiterated the three areas the Supreme
Court has recognized in which ERISA was intended to preempt state law
claims.24 State laws are preempted if they: (1) mandate employee benefit
structures or their administration; (2) bind employers or plan administrators to
particular choices or preclude uniform administrative practices thereby
functioning as regulations of an ERISA plan themselves; or (3) provide alternate
enforcement mechanisms for employees to obtain ERISA benefits.2" If the
state claim falls outside these three areas, arises from state laws of general
applicability, or does not depend on ERISA or affect the relationship between
principal ERISA participants, the state claim is not preempted." 9 This test
more clearly delineates the "connection with" test from Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.,250 but the "reference to" test remains unchanged.2 ' The Ninth Circuit
has said:
The key to distinguishing between what ERISA preempts and what it
does not lies . . . in recognizing that the statute comprehensively
regulates certain relationships. [F]or instance, the relationship between
plan and plan member, between plan and employer, between employer
and employee ... and between plan and trustee.... But, ERISA
doesn't purport to regulate those relationships where a plan operates just
like any other commercial entity-for instance, the relationship between
the plan and its own employees, or the plan and its insurers or
creditors.. 22
The Ninth Circuit has also clarified what is not meant by "administering" a plan;
the performance of ministerial, non-discretionary functions is not administration
of a plan, and a person without authority to grant, deny, or review denial claims
is not a fiduciary.25
This test was applied in Moreno v. Health Partners Health Plan.2 4 The
plaintiff in this case brought a medical malpractice action against his HMO and
245. Id.
246. 130 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1997).
247. Geweke, 130 F.3d at 1360.
248. Id. (citing New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-61, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677-79 (1995) as summarized by the 4th Circuit in
Coyne & Delany v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457, 1468 (4th Cir. 1996)).
249. Arizona State Carpenters Pension Fund v. Citibank, 125 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1997).
250. 463 U.S. 85, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983).
251. Arizona, 125 F.3d at 724 & n.4.
252. Id. (citing General American Life Ins. Co. v. Castonguay, 984 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (9th Cir.
1993)).
253. Geweke Ford v. St. Joseph's Omni Preferred Care Inc., 130 F.3d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir.
1997).
254. 4 F. Supp. 2d 888 (D. Ariz. 1998).
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physician alleging negligence in the creation of a substandard care plan.255 The
court held that medical malpractice is a state common law claim that is not
preempted by ERISA.Y The court applied the Ninth Circuit's "relationship"
test and found that the ability to sue on a medical malpractice claim does not fit
within the three areas of exclusive federal control.25 Furthermore, medical
malpractice claims are grounded in state common laws of general application to
any medical practitioner whether or not the medical care was arranged for, paid
for, or the physician was engaged by an employer benefit plan.25 Lastly, the
possibility of a medical malpractice claim does not affect the relationship
between principal ERISA entities. 2" The court found that the medical
malpractice claim was not completely preempted by ERISA and remanded the
case to state court.
26°
d. Effects
Each of these tests seems to recognize the dual nature of IHMOs-as
providers of care and as administrators of health plans. Under early ERISA
analysis, these roles were not considered separately because they were so closely
related to each other as to give rise to complete preemption of the plaintiffs' state
law claims against HMOs. With the Supreme Court's step back from reading the
"relates to" clause to the "limits of its indeterminacy," however, lower courts
have begun to differentiate the functions of these two roles.
Clearly, state laws affecting the administration of ERISA plans are expressly
preempted under the civil enforcement statute. But, in considering the
congressional intent for enacting ERISA and following the assumption that
Congress has no intent to supplant state law, lower courts have been able to
determine that claims against HMOs acting in the role as providers of care were
not intended to be completely preempted. This is supported by the fact that, at
the time ERISA was passed, health care was delivered on a fee-for-service basis
and not through managed care. It is doubtful that Congress could have foreseen
the impact of the tremendous growth of HMOs; nor could legislators foretell this
dual role of HMOs which has resulted in a judicially created immunity for
IMOs.
Under the Third Circuit's "quality v. quantity" test, attacks on the quality of
care provided reflect the IMO's behavior in its "provider of medical care" role.
This implies that a patient-provider relationship is not protected by ERISA. This




259. Moreno, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
260. Id. The court did recognize that Arizona state law regarding corporate practice ofmedicine
might serve as a defense at the state court level, but did not decide this issue because the court was
without subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
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is stated more clearly in the Ninth Circuit's test. The result of this test is that,
if a plaintiff's complaint alleges the HMO acted negligently in the "provider of
care" role, the claim is less likely to be completely preempted in federal court.
However, if the plaintiff, on the face of his complaint, alleges that injury resulted
from a denial of benefits by the HMO, the claim will be completely preempted
because it is based on the role of the HMO as administrator of the plan. If the
claims are remanded to state court, the possibility exists that the claims may still
be preempted by ERISA's conflict preemption clause. At this level, however,
the plaintiff has a better chance of recovering for damages because (1) he is not
limited only to recovery of the cost of denied benefit, and (2) he may invoke his
right to a trial by jury.
B. Legislative and Regulatory Changes
1. Congress
Though changes are apparent in the judicial interpretation of ERISA, there
is still no consistent result. A claim that one circuit court finds preempted may
not be preempted in another circuit. Typically, the defendant HMOs' first
defense is to have a negligence or medical malpractice action immediately
removed to federal court and have the federal court determine that the claims are
completely preempted. Under the old "everything relates to" analysis, the federal
courts' jurisdiction was easy to satisfy, and state law claims were quickly
preempted. Under the newer analysis, federal courts must carefully scrutinize the
records and make a determination of federal jurisdiction on a case-by-casebasis.
These determinations can tie the federal courts up for months, and under the new
tests, many of these cases will ultimately be remanded to state court. To level
the playing field between parties and eliminate judicial inefficiency, Congress
should amend ERISA so that medical malpractice suits will be expressly allowed
against ERISA-qualified HMOs.
As the result of consumer complaints, this issue was a "hot topic" in the
105th congressional session. The political parties are sharply divided on the
issue of HMO liability. Republicans claim allowing liability will result in
increased costs and a flood of litigation; Democrats deny this. Several bills were
proposed to afford patients with more protections against their HMOs, but none
of these bills was enacted.26'
The first bill 62 was passed in the House of Representatives and was known
as the "Patient Protection Act." This was the Republican House Bill, and it
would not have removed the immunity from liability that HMOs enjoy. This bill
left the right to make decisions regarding "medical necessity" in the hands of the
insurance companies rather than with physicians. There was no requirement that
261. The President Clinton/Monica Lewinsky scandal derailed these legislative efforts.
262. H.R. 4250, proposed by Representative Newt Gingrich and supported by business groups.
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grievance and appeals processes be conducted by health professionals, and
patients would have been required to pay for any external review. This bill even
went so far as to create new federal preemption of state protection laws for
associations' health plans and would have overriddenpatientprotections currently
enacted in several states. Furthermore, it did not hold health plans properly
accountable for treatment decisions resulting in injury or death. This bill met
with a tremendous amount of criticism, voiced most succinctly by Donna E.
Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services:
I'm extremely disappointed in th[is] bill.... While it may protect
HMO profits, it certainly won't protect patients' rights. Americansneed
a Patients' Bill of Rights that delivers real reforms. Th[is] bill simply
gives lip service to those reforms, without really accomplishing
them .... The House bill leaves millions of Americans in the
individual insurance market out in the cold, offering them no protections
at all.... It sets up an appeals process that has no teeth, and leaves
crucial decisions about health care in the hands of the HMO bureau-
crats, instead of doctors and their patients. It leaves patients and their
families with no right to just compensation when injury or death result
from a health care plan's wrongful action.263
The second major proposal, known as the "Patient's Bill of Rights, ' 2" was
supported by the American Medical Association and numerous other consumer
advocacy groups and medical groups. It provided a grievance and appeals process
for protesting benefit denial decisions which must be reviewed for a timely
resolution. If the patient utilized an external source to review the decision, the
plan would be required to pay.265 In addition, utilization review must be done
by qualified trained personnel, there can be no incentives that reward denials and
decisions must be based on a "medicallynecessary standard." Also, this proposal
would have allowed individuals to sue under state causes of action for personal
injury or wrongful death actions against the health plan. Employers would be
protected from suits unless they made a decision to deny care that caused injury
or death. This bill expressly eliminated ERISA preemption. A major criticism
263. Press Release, Statement by Health and Human Services Secretary Donna E. Shalala on'
H.R. 4250, The House Republican Leadership's "Patient Protection Act of 1998," July 24, 1998
(Contact HHS Press Office (202) 690-6343). See also Alice Ann Love, GOP, Dems Differ on HMO
Oversight, Associated Press Online, July 16, 1998 (1998 WL 6696207) (This bill would only give
limited protection to the 48 million Americans insured by non-ERISA qualified health plans and no
protection to the 125 million Americans insured by ERISA qualified health plans.).
264. H.R. 3605/S. 1890, known as the"Daschle/Dingell" bill, the "Democratic bill" and, because
it was also supported by Republican Representative Ganske, also called the "bipartisan bill."
265. Id. The bill provided that: "Appeals and grievances must have a process for timely
resolution and procedures for follow-up; a 72 hour limit for expedited internal review, 15 days for
others-interal appeals may be oral and can be bypassed if plan misses deadlines; and external review
if internal appeals were exhausted if life or health was in jeopardy with the following time limits-72
hours for expedited and up to 60 days for others-to be paid for the plan."
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of this proposal was that allowing suits against HMOs would drastically increase
the cost of health care.2 s However, a study by the Congressional Budget
Office indicated that this health care reform would raise insurance costs four
percent, which would be approximately $6.50 per month per employee.267
Other studies indicated costs would only increase between three to thirteen cents
per month per plan enrollee or between 2.6% to 8.6% a year.
26
The third major proposal was the Senate Republican bill, known as the
"Patient Access to Responsible Care Act" (PARCA).269 This proposal was also
supported by consumer groups and provided many of the same protections as the
Patient Bill of Rights. For grievances and appeals, the bill provided that patients
must have the ability to appeal adverse decisions for denial of claims or
reimbursement. Internal review was to be done by appropriate clinical peers in
a timely manner.270 Utilization review, based on "sound medical evidence,"
was to be applied by health professionals, and there could be no incentives to
compensate for denials of care. Furthermore, patients could hold managed care
decision makers legally responsible for injuries suffered as a direct result of their
decisions. This permitted state liability laws to apply to ERISA plans in cases
of wrongful death or injury and did not specifically exempt employers from
being sued. One study by the Health Benefits Coalition called this proposal the
"Billion Dollar Bill" because ERISA plans would be exposed to three new types
of legal liability that would add almost one billion dollars to the annual cost of
the health care delivery system.27' Proponents of this bill, however, claimed
this study was greatly exaggerated and the costs would actually be about one
dollar per month per person.7
The final major proposal was the Republicans' "Patient Bill of Rights."273
This proposal basically maintained the status quo and was allegedly full of
"poison pills." '274 This bill did not allow physicians the right to make final
treatment decisions, nor did it hold managed care plans accountable when their
decisions to withhold or limit care injured patients. Additionally, this bill did not
provide patients the right to obtain external review of benefit decisions.
266. Alice Ann Love, Plans Differ on Patients' Rights, Associated Press Online, July 17, 1998
(1998 WL 6696853).
267. Id.
268. Insurance Regulation: New Analysis of Health Plan Liability Puts Cost at Three to 13
Cents per Month, BNA's Health Care Daily Report, July 9, 1998.
269. H.R. 1415/S. 644 sponsored by Representative Norwood and Senator D'Amato.
270. "Timely manner" would be within 1 hour for urgent cases and 24 hours for all others.
271. Study Calls PARCA the Billion-Dollar Bill, 2 No. 6 Mealey's Litigation Reports: Managed
Care 13, Mar. 24, 1998.
272. Id.
273. S. 2330 sponsored by Senators Lott and Nickles and known as the Senate Republican Bill
or the Republican Patient's Bill of Rights.
274. These "poison pills" were items included in the bill to guarantee that if it were passed, it
would ultimately be vetoed.
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Each of these bills died in the 105th Congress, subordinated to the Monica
Lewinsky scandal which thwarted any attempt by Congress to support reform
efforts.275 This has left open the doors of opportunity for reform to the 106th
Congress.276 Representative Norwood was the first to introduce a health care
reform bill in the 106th Congress. 2' This new proposal, H.R. 216, was
introduced January 8, 1999 and is known as the "Access to Quality Care Act"
(AQCA).27' It is essentially a revised version of the 1998 PARCA bill, but
also incorporates components of the Patient Protection Act (H.R. 4250).279
Opponents to this new proposal have called it "little more than last year's
Democratic bill in Republican clothing."280 Representative Norwood has stated
he will not support a partisan bill in 1999 and claims this proposal is biparti-
san.
2 81
AQCA's most notable provisions include: (1) amending ERISA to remove
immunity from liability for HMOs, and (2) adopting an appeals process that
allows patients to seek redress from health plans that have denied treatment
coverage, despite recommendations from medical specialists. 82 The language
of this bill explicitly removes the right to ERISA preemption under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 from HMOs. It states:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supercede any cause of action under State law to recover-damages
resulting from personal injury or for wrongful death against any person
in connection with the provision of insurance, administrative services,
or medical services by such person to or for a group health plan, or that
arises out of the arrangement by such person for the provision of such
insurance, administrative services or medical services by other per-
sons.
2 83
However, the bill does exclude causes of action against employers or plan
sponsors who maintain the group health plan.284  A provision for an appeals
275. Curtis D. Rooney, The States, Congress or the Courts: Who Will be First to Reform ERISA
Remedies?, 7 Annals Health L 73, 102 (1998).
276. Id.
277. Plan Regulation: NorwoodIntroducesNew Managed Care Bill, Says Partisan Bills Cannot
Pass Congress, BNA's Health Care Daily Report, Jan. 8, 1999.
278. rd.
279. Norwood's New Health Bill Draws Familiar Criticism, Federal Filing Newswires, Dow
Jones & Company, Inc., Jan. 8, 1999.
280. Plan Regulation, supra note 277. See supra notes 266 and 271 and accompanying text
noting that both the Democratic bill and PARCA supported removal of the ERISA clause which has
granted HMOs immunity from liability.
281. Id.
282. Politics & Policy-Patients' Rights: Norwood to Introduce Newest Reform Bill, American
Political Network, Vol. 6, No. 9 (Jan. 8, 1999).
283. H.R. 216, § 302(eXIXA) & (B) (1999).
284. H.R. 216, § 302(eX2XA) (1999).
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process allows for "fast track" access to the courts for patients who are too ill to
go through the usual, lengthy appeals process.a It also requires health plans
to create external review boards with authority to make binding decisions on
appeals brought by patients who have been denied services.216  Failure to
comply with this provision could result in the health plans being subject to fines
of $750 per day up to $250,000, owed to the patient.' 7 This bill has been met
with the same criticisms as the 1998 proposals, primarily the threat of increased
health care costs and the potential for poorer quality of care because HMOs willbe forced to spend financial resources on litigation rather than health care.288
2. United States Department of Labor
Also in response to consumer complaints, the United States Department of
Labor (DOL) proposed rules on September 9, 1998, to strengthen the rights of
workers in health benefit plans.289 These regulatory rules had not been updated
since 1977."' The DOL has the authority to administer and enforce
ERISA. 29' These proposals are part of the Department's commitment to
implementing the recommendations of the President's Advisory Commission on
Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry. 2 These rules
would guarantee participants prompt and fair consideration of their claims forhealth and other benefits. The provisions include: (1) shortening the time limits
for making health benefit claim decisions; (2) requiring plans to provide better
information about appeal rights and why benefits were denied; and (3) a
requirement that decisions be based on medical judgements in consultation with
an independent health care professional.293 Opponents to these proposed rules
argue that the DOL has exceeded its authority and the rules will increase costs
and place a heavy burden on employee benefit plans.294 One opponent stated
these regulations indicated the DOL's lack of faith in the legislative process as
many of the DOL's regulations had also been proposed in the health care reform
285. Plan Regulation, supra note 277.
286. Politics & Policy-Patients Rights, supra note 282.
287. Id.
288. Plan Regulation, supra note 277.
289. Pension and Welfare Benefits Association (PWBA) National Office Press Release Sept. 8,
1998.
290. Employee Benefits: Benefits Professionals, Advocacy Groups React to Health Claims
Procedure Plans, BNA's Health Care Policy Report, Sept. 21, 1998.
291. Pension and Welfare Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Report to the President
and Vice President of the United States: Implementing the Commission's Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities through ERISA, Feb. 19, 1998.
292. Id. See also Rooney, supra note 275 (During his 1996 Presidential campaign, President
Clinton established the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health CareIndustry. This Commission recommended a "Patient Bill of Rights" and the President instructed
federal programs to implement as many of the Commission's recommendations as possible.).
293. PWBA, supra note 289.
294. Employee Benefits, supra note 290.
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legislation of 1998." In retrospect, this lack of faith seems to have been well-
placed. Because these proposed regulations have generated loud protests from
opponents to health care reform, the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee is planning a hearing to review these new rules.
296
The DOL has long supported finding against ERISA preemption in many
amici briefs filed through the years. 9' Most recently, the DOL filed an amicus
brief in Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v. Ward,29 the ERISA case in
which the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari. The DOL, in its brief,
argues that patients should not be precluded from suing for damages under state
insurance laws for denials of benefits.2 The DOL wanted a "common-sense"
approach applied to the question of HMO liability."° This filing concerns
"insured" plans in which employers buy health insurance policies for their
employees. 30' This new position taken by the DOL could have a major impact
on court decisions as well as on making it easier for states to pass laws allowing
for suits against health plans for denial of benefits.02
3. Changes at the State Level
Many state legislatures have passed their own patient protections acts in
1997 and 1998. Some states have eliminated their "corporate medicine" statutes
which have been used as a defense by HMOs. In 1997, Texas passed a bill
expressly allowing HMOs to be sued for liability. 3 The bill went into effect
295. Id.
296. Plan Regulation: Senate Labor Committee Planning Hearing on Labor Department's
ERISA Claims Rule, BNA's Health Care Daily Report. Jan. 13, 1999. (The DOL has received more
then 600 comment letters in response to the proposed rules. Most of these have been from business
groups and health insurers.).
297. See, e.g., Marc Machiz, Amicus Briefs Filed by the Secretary of Labor from January 1.
1994 Through April 30, 1997-Prepared by the Plan Benefits Security Division Office of the
Solicitor, ELC Glass CLE-675 (1998) (citing Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1009, 116 S. CL 564 (1995)) (DOL amici briefs arguing that state
malpractice claims by an employee benefit plan are not preempted by ERISA and ERISA does not
preempt an HMO's liability for malpractice merely because the patient was a participant in an ERISA
covered health plan); Robbins v. HIP of New Jersey, 625 Ad 45 (NJ. Super. CL Law Div. 1993)
(DOL amicus arguing that claims of vicarious liability against an HMO for the medical malpractice
of its doctors not preempted by ERISA); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 297 (1998) (DOL amicus argues that claims of fraud, misrepresentation and
interference with a doctor-patient relationship not preempted).
298. 135 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 119 S. CL 334 (1998); see also Laurie McGinley,






303. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 88.001-.003 (Vernon's 1997 & Supp. 1998). This
new law also eliminates the "corporate medicine" defense. See § 88.002(b) (Tex. 1997).
1999]
LOUISIANA L4 W REVIEW
September 1, 1997 and allows consumers the right to sue HMOs and to collect
damages if the HMOs' treatment decisions result in harm to the consumer.'"
Under this bill, an HMO may be held liable for breaching a duty to exercise
ordinary care or for decisions made by employees or agents acting on behalf of
the IMO.
305
Immediately after passage, this law was challenged by several subsidiary
HMOs of Aetna on the grounds that its provisions were preempted by
ERISA. 0 6 United States District Judge, Vanessa Gilmore, upheld the portion
of the law allowing suits against IMOs, but struck down the law's independent
review provisions as being preempted by ERISA117 In issuing this decision,
Judge Gilmore invited Congress to redefine ERISA: "If Congress wants the
American citizens to have access to adequate health care, then Congress must
accept its responsibility to define the scope of ERISA preemption and to enact
legislation that will ensure every patient has access to that care.""' The effects
of this decision are, as yet, unknown. Proponents of the law claim that this ruling
will allow suits against HMOs for injuries resulting from denial of care or for
failure to exercise ordinary care.30 9 However, opponents of the law also claim
the decision as a victory based on Judge Gilmore's language restricting suits"
against HMOs to "cases in which an HMO actually delivers poor care, not
disputes over HMO treatment decisions., 3 0 As a result, opponents claim, an
injured plaintiff in Texas would be unable to obtain relief on the basis that an
HMO's negligent decision to deny benefits resulted in patient harm.3t ' Despite
these contradictory opinions, Judge Gilmore's rulings do suggest an increasing
willingness on the part of courts to recognize the distinction between the quality
and quantity of benefits under an employee benefit plan."' Appeals have been
304. Amy Stoeckl, Refusing to Follow Doctor's Orders: Texas Takes the First Step in Holding
HMOs Liable for Bad Medical Decisions, 18 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 387, 402 (1998).
305. Id.
306. Corporate Health Ins. Co. v. Texas Dept. of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
307. Id. See also Deborah W. Larrios, Barbarians at the Gate? An Essay on Payor Liability
In an Era of Managed Care, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 445, 453 (1998). See also Charles Ornstein, Judge
Upholds State Law that Lets Patients Sue Over HMO Denials but Ruling Strikes Down Much of
Independent Review Process, The Dallas Morning News, Sept. 19,1998 (1998 WL 13103652) (The
loss of the independent review process has disappointed parties on both sides of the issue. This
process has been used by more then 200 Texans to resolve their benefit disputes. Now, patients must
actually sue after being harmed to attempt to resolve any disputes. This decision is also harmful for
the insurance companies because it invalidates a process designed to prevent litigation and the
insurance companies must now bear the risk of litigation.).
308. Corporate Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 616 n.7.
309. Ornstein, supra note 307.
310. Managed Care Monitor: Texas: Aetna Happy with Ruling. But State will Appeal,
American Political Network, Vol. 6, Oct. 6, 1998.
311. Brenda T. Strarna & Elizabeth Rogers, Splitting the Baby? A Houston Federal Court's
Gloss on Managed Care May Have Killed Most of the Texas Legislature's Landmark Reforms, Tex.
Law, Vol. 14, No. 38 (1998).
312. Rooney, supra note 275, at 100.
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filed by both parties in a scramble to save the review process, but legal experts
claim Aetna's appeal will also enable the company to challenge the right-to-sue
provision." Those who disfavor Judge Gilmore's ruling say it is likely the
Fifth Circuit will overturn the right-to-sue provision as preempted by
ERISA.31' Others, however, are confident the law, which was written with the
Fifth Circuit's prior decisions and language in mind, will survive the chal-
lenge. 1
5
In addition to Aetna's challenge, one month after Judge Gilmore's decision,
the first state court suit was filed under this new law.
3
"
6 In this case, the
plaintiff, Kathryn Plocica, filed suit against her health plan for the wrongful
death of her husband who died after drinking antifreeze.
1 She sought actual
and punitive damages."' Mr. Plocica was being treated for severe depression,
but his HMO ordered him discharged over his physician's objections.1 9 He
committed suicide within hours of being discharged from the hospital.
2 The
suit alleged that the causes of action arose under the Texas Act because the
health plan "controlled or influenced the quality of the medical diagnosis, care,
and treatment of Mr. Plocica." '32 The defendants removed the case to federal
court, but the court agreed with the plaintiff that there was no basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction because the defendant failed to carry its burden that
at least one of the causes of action was subject to complete preemption."m The
case was remanded to state court."u The plaintiff's petition was couched in
terms of "quality of care" rather than "denial of benefits" and the defendant was
a non-ERISA health plan, so it is unclear whether the decision in this case will
answer whether the Texas law will survive ERISA preemption.
24
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Congress' intent in enacting ERISA in 1974 was to provide protection to
employees with regard to their pension plans. ERISA was meant to protect
employees' pension funds from mismanagement and end the problem of
employees relying on pension plans that were unavailable at retirement because
313. Sarah A. Klein, Legal Wrangling Continues on Texas HMO Law, American Medical News,
December 14, 1998 (1998 WL 20199136).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Plocica v. NYLCare of Texas Inc., Case No. 141-175780-98 (141st JDC TX 1998).
317. Brenda S. Jeffreys, First State-Court Suit Filed Under HMO-Llabliy Law, Tex. Law. Vol.




321. Strara & Rogers, supra note 311.





of poor investments or lack of any investments at all. Instead, ERISA provides
equitable remedies for those actions it sought to protect against and preempts
state laws so that pension plans can be administered by the states in a uniform
way. Additionally, ERISA serves to foreclose recovery of punitive and
compensatory damages.
In considering the original intent behind ERISA, it is also important to
remember the basic purposes of tort law. These are to preserve the peace by
acting as a substitute for vengeance, to find fault for wrongdoing and to provide
for compensation for injury caused by that wrongdoing, and to discourage future
wrongdoing. A basic premise of tort law is that the wrongdoer owes some duty
to the injured party which was breached in some manner resulting in harm or
injury.
At the time ERISA was enacted, the nation's health care was primarily
delivered in the traditional fee-for-service or pay-as-you-go method that had
existed for generations. Under this traditional system, relationships between the
patient and the doctor were direct, and defining what was meant by the delivery
of medical care was simple. If the doctor breached some duty to his patient, the
patient had causes of action in tort against the doctor and could be compensated
for any wrongdoing by the doctor which resulted in harm to the patient. This
is the main principle underlying medical malpractice which fits the basic
purposes of tort law. Through the years, this principle of liability has been
applied to other health care providers such as nurses and hospitals.
The managed health care system as it exists today was not contemplated by
Congress in 1974. Under this modem health care delivery system, the
relationships between a patient and those providing him with medical care are
increasingly complex and the definition of "provision of care" has become
blurred. Though traditional medical malpractice claims still exist, it has become
more difficult to map out what duties are owed and by whom they are owed,
given these newly intricate provider-patient relationships. Statutory and case law
has been relied on to characterize these relationships.
Initially, managed care organizations, or -MOs, avoided liability for claims
of medical malpractice by asserting they were not practicing medicine, either on
the basis of state statutory prohibition of corporate medicine or on the grounds
that treatment decisions were merely methods of administering a "pension plan."
As the number of managed care organizations grew, they became characterized
under ERISA as welfare benefit plans. This has allowed these organizations to
use ERISA as a defense against traditional tort claims of medical malpractice.
This, in turn, has led to the current debate of whether HMOs actually provide
medical care for which they can be held accountable or whether they only act to
administer the plans. Allowing HMOs to rely on ERISA as a defense, however,
goes against the intent of Congress in enacting ERISA to protect employees.
Permitting managed care organizations to avoid liability actually serves to protect
the employers and the plans themselves. This immunity from liability is also
contrary to traditional tort theories which have served to grant some recompense
to victims of wrongdoing.
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First, the patient, who becomes a participant in the HMO by virtue of some
employee-employer relationship, is often limited financially or through his
employment in his choice of health care providers. This places the patient in a
vulnerable and dependent position with respect to the HMO who may be
responsible for making crucial health care decisions. Despite this vulnerability
and dependency, however, HMOs under ERISA have no need to worry about
being held accountable to patients for the effects of their decisions. Without the
restraint of accountability, HMOs have been able to utilize methods to ostensibly
contain health care costs which translate into profits for the organization at the
risk of quality health care. This plays havoc with the deterrent role of basic tort
theory.
Additionally, HMOs claim to have no duty to patients in regard to health
care. A typical argument is that although a doctor, employed by an IH-MO, must
comply with the policies and procedures of that HMO, it ultimately remains the
doctor's duty to decide medical issues. So, for example, in a situation in which
a doctor recommends a life-saving procedure that is denied by the HMO, the
doctor must disregard the IMO's regulations and perform the surgery anyway.
This puts the doctor at risk for sanctions for not working within his employer's
mandates and puts the patient at risk for out-of-pocket expenses that the patient
expected to be paid by his health plan. If the physician chooses to follow the
decision made by the HMO, he could be directly liable to the patient for failing
to perform the surgery. This system places doctors in a difficult position, forcing
them to choose between their own livelihood and their duty to the patient. With
no duty owed to the patient, the HMO cannot be found at fault for any
wrongdoing, and again, reliance on tort law fails.
Congress did not intend to place traditional tort theories beyond the reach
of those most in need of their protecti6ns. Congress never meant for tort law
and ERISA to become mutually exclusive such that if a patient receives benefits
under an ERISA plan, then he gives up the protections afforded him under tort
theory. To read ERISA in this way has led to unfair and unjust results. To
return to the original intent behind ERISA, statutory law must be amended to
remove this unintentional immunity from liability for ERISA plans, or the
judiciary must exercise its role in interpreting ERISA in light of Congress' intent
to protect employees.
In order to honor the primary objective of ERISA to protect employees, and
the secondary goal of uniform state regulation, the most effective means for
change would be for Congress to expressly amend ERISA so that state law
claims will no longer be preempted. Because federal law preempts state law by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, a congressional amendment
would easily accomplish the goal of uniformity underlying ERISA.
The strongest argument against amending ERISA is that doing so will
drastically increase the cost of health care and make affordable health insurance
less available to the public. This concern can easily be addressed in new
legislation. For example, Congress could amend ERISA to create a federal cause
of action against ERISA plans, but could place caps on medical malpractice
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damages to address the concern of increased cost. But a more favorable solution
could be for Congress simply to amend ERISA to remove preemption of medical
malpractice claims. This would allow state courts to hear medical malpractice
claims which fall within a field traditionally occupied by the states: regulation
of matters of health and safety. This would be consistent with ERISA's goal of
uniformity by eliminating the conflicting interpretations of ERISA among the
federal circuit courts. Because most states already have damage caps in place,
it would also provide HMOs with protection against unlimited damage awards.
Though many attempts to change the existing law were made in the 105th
Congress, none of those measures came to fiuition. Representative Norwood's
newest proposal, H.R. 216, appears to be a viable attempt to accomplish
ERISA's goals. The proposed language expressly eliminates ERISA preemption
for decisions to provide or deny care which result in harm to the participant.
This bill would protect participants as well as maintain the requirement of
uniformity. Participants would be protected because the doors would be opened
to tort law remedies for compensationby the wrongdoer for injuries. Uniformity
would be met by allowing states to apply their own state law.
Currently, the split in the federal circuits demonstrates that state law applies
in some jurisdictions but not in others, so that ERISA is currently not acting to
regulate the states in a uniform way. Under H.R. 216, HMOs would become
accountable for treatment decisions under state law. Additionally, the proposal
mandates external appeals procedures that would result in binding decisions.
Failure to comply with this mandate could result in fines to the HMOs, but only
up to a cap of $250,000. This bill would protect the participants' interest in
being compensated for their injuries and would protect the HMOs' interest in
cost-containment strategies through the appeals process cap as well as through
state law caps. HMOs should take into account the cost of litigation when
evaluating the costs of doing business, and application of state law damages caps
would assist them in projecting future expenses. Congress should also clarify
what is meant by "employers" and "plan sponsors" where the bill excludes such
persons from available causes of action. Clarifying these terms will help avoid
the same problem of broad judicial interpretation encountered under ERISA.
Without clarification, a court may deem HMOs to fall within one of these
excepted categories and participants would, once again, be left without any
meaningful remedy.
Absent congressional action to expressly amend ERISA, the DOL's
regulations should be adopted. These regulations would provide uniformity in
the appeals procedures available to participants. However, these proposed
regulations do nothing to address the preemption problem because this issue is
outside the scope of the DOL's authority.
If Congress fails to act, it will continue to be the job of the courts to
interpret ERISA. The Supreme Court has begun to narrow and clarify the
meaning of the "relates to" preemption provision of ERISA, beginning with the
Travelers case and continued in subsequent cases. Furthermore, the Court has
stated that there is a considerable burden to overcome the presumption that
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Congress hadno intention of supplanting state law in fields traditionally occupied
by the states such as public health and safety. However, these prior pronounce-
ments of the Supreme Court have not gone far enough in explaining the extent
to which ERISA preemption should be limited. Rather, lower courts have
interpreted these decisions almost as broadly as the Supreme Court's early,
expansive "relates to" analysis.
From the unanimous opinion in Travelers to the majority opinions in
Dillingham and De Buono, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its willingness
to be the instrument of change regarding this complex and controversial
preemption issue. But, it is time for the Court to stop testing the waters and to
dive fully into this controversy. As Justice Scalia wrote in his concurring
opinion in Dillingham, joined by Justice Ginsburg:
[The] opinion [in Dillingham] is no more likely than our earlier ones,
to bring clarity to this field.... I think it would greatly assist our
function of clarifying the law if we simply acknowledged that our first
take on [ERISA] was wrong: that the "relate to" clause of the
preemption provision is meant, not to set forth a test of preemption, but
rather to identify the field in which ordinary field preemption ap-
plies-namely, the field of laws regulating "employee benefit
plan[s]."2
Adopting this solution would eliminate the difficult task faced by the courts in
attempting to determine what Congress meant by "relat[ing] to" an ERISA plan.
In addition, the Supreme Court should formulate a test to aid the courts in
distinguishing between the administrator and provider roles played by -MOs.
Or, the Court could simply adopt a test developed by one of the Circuits such as
the Third Circuit's "quality v. quantity" test. 26 Formulating a new test or
adopting an existing one would accomplish the goals of Congress in enacting this
statute. Participants would be protected because they would have a cause of
action against the HMOs in cases of wrongdoing. Additional protection would
come from the deterrent affect on IMOs in knowing they will be held
accountable for decisions that affect the care provided to their participants. A
test adopted by the Supreme Court would also lend itself to a uniform application
of ERISA by resolving the split in the Circuits, acting as a guide for the lower
courts, and eliminating the disparate results for injured parties in different
jurisdictions.
Patients/participants must be afforded some protection against wrongful acts
by their health plans that result in harm or injury. Congress should expressly
amend ERISA to remove the immunity enjoyed by HMOs and to allow for some
causes of action to proceed against HMOs in state court. Congress should adopt
325. California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcementv. Dillingham Construction, 519 U.S. 316,
321, 117 S. Ct. 832, 843 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 197-215.
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a version of a bill similar to Representative Norwood's proposal in the 106th
Congress which would provide protection to consumers as well as expressly give
patients the right to sue their health plans when benefit decisions result in injury.
Until such a bill is enacted, the DOL's recommendations should be adopted so
that participants have a universal appeals procedure in place. If the Texas right-
to-sue law survives ERISA preemption in early court decisions, other states
should follow Texas' lead. Absent state or federal legislative action, the liability
of HMOs will only be established by jurisprudence. The Supreme Court should
adopt a test clearly defining the scope of ERISA preemption such as the Third
Circuit's "quality v. quantity" test. Congress and the courts should listen to the
complaints about HMOs and carefully heed the grumbles of dissatisfaction with
the current state of affairs.
Dawn Lauren Morris*
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